We analyze how the political preferences of CEOs affect their employees' campaign contributions and electoral choices. Employees donate almost three times more money to CEOsupported political candidates than to candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation also holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to death or retirement. CEO influence is strongest in firms that explicitly advocate for political candidates and firms with politically connected CEOs. Finally, employees are more likely to vote in elections in those congressional districts where CEOs are more politically active. Our results suggest that CEOs are a political force. JEL classification codes: G30, D72, P48
Introduction
A large literature examines interactions between firms and politicians and argues that participation in the political process may be valuable to firms. Firms can invest in political capital by establishing direct connections with legislators, for example through employment of current or former politicians (Faccio (2006) ; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) ; Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009); Duchin and Sosyura (2012) ), by spending money on lobbying (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2014) ; Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2015) ), and by financing candidates' political campaigns through corporate political action committees, known as PACs (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) ; Akey (2015)). These activities may create value for firms' shareholders because of subsidies, preferential allocation of government contracts and external financing, less strict regulation, and lighter taxation. Yet another, and largely unexplored, mechanism through which firms can establish political connections is campaign contributions made by their employees. In fact, political contributions made by individuals far exceed those made by corporate PACs. For example, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) show that during the 1999-2000 election cycle candidates in congressional elections raised over three times more money directly from individuals than they did from PACs. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs attempt to influence which candidates their employees support and contribute to. For example, companies such as 1 The positive effect of political activism on firm value is documented in, e.g., Fisman (2001) ; Johnson and Mitton (2003) ; Faccio (2006) , Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006); Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) ; Ferguson and Voth (2008) ; Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009); Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010); Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011); Duchin and Sosyura (2012) ; Amore and Bennedsen (2013) ; Correia (2014); Tahoun (2014) ; Akey (2015) ; Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2015) ; Brogaard, Denes, and Duchin (2015) ; and Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak, and Mitton (2016) . In contrast, Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2012) find evidence that corporate donations to political candidates are negatively correlated with returns and contend that donations are symptomatic of agency problems. Coates (2012) argues that corporate political contributions are motivated at least in part by the personal ambitions of firms ' CEOs, and Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2010) show that many businessmen run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials.
Pfizer and Koch Industries send educational materials to employees about their firms' preferred political choices and nudge employees to participate in political meetings, write letters and emails to politicians, donate, campaign, and vote in particular ways.
2 Some firms go even further and offer perks for employee political contributions. BP, for example, allows its employees to choose better parking spots in the company lot if they donate at least 2.5 percent of their salary to the company PAC.
In this paper, we analyze whether firms are able to systematically influence their employees' political choices by studying how political preferences of CEOs affect campaign donations and voter turnout of their firms' employees. Using a large sample of S&P 1,500 firms between 1999 and 2014, we find that employee donations to political candidates seeking federal office strongly respond to how their firms' CEOs donate. For example, Figure 1 shows that employees of firms whose CEOs contributed to only one of the two presidential candidates in the 2012 election (Barack Obama or Mitt Romney) contributed approximately two times more to the candidate supported by their CEO than to his opponent. We find similar effects for all U.S. federal elections. After we control for common determinants of political contributions and account for firm, candidate, and election cycle fixed effects, we estimate that employees direct approximately three times more of their campaign contributions to political candidates supported by their firm's CEO than to otherwise similar candidates.
That CEOs and employees donate to the same political candidates does not necessarily imply a causal relation, but neither is it to be expected. Even though employees and CEOs may be subject to common economic forces, participation in the political process is a high civic duty and is not determined by economic factors alone. Moreover, employees typically have different socioeconomic characteristics from those of CEOs and may therefore favor different political outcomes.
There are three potential explanations for the observed positive relation between CEO and employee contributions. First, the set of political candidates instrumental to the firm's success may change over time independently of CEOs' actions, and both CEOs and employees may simply recognize these changes and adjust their contributions accordingly. In this case, CEOs do not have an independent direct effect on employee political decisions. Second, CEO actions may change the nature of the firm's operations and thereby change the set of the firm's preferred political candidates, which in turn affects to whom employees want to donate. 3 Under this explanation, changes in employee political contributions are a consequence of CEOs' actions, but perhaps an unintended one. Third, CEOs can make deliberate attempts to influence their employees' political choices. We conduct a series of tests to distinguish between these three explanations and find strong evidence that changes in CEOs' political preferences affect their employees' campaign contributions. Further, at least in some cases CEOs make intentional attempts to influence their employees' political choices and these attempts succeed.
In our first set of tests, we show that economic and political factors common to CEOs and employees cannot explain away the relation between CEO and employee contributions. One such factor is political candidates' strength and ideology. We find, however, that our results hold if we include candidate or candidate-cycle fixed effects, or if we control for the candidate's party, 3 Employees may donate to the CEO's preferred political candidates even if the nature of the firm's operations doesn't change. For example, employees may observe the CEO's political preferences and donate to the candidates favored by the CEO either because employees believe that these candidates are beneficial to the firm or because they want to please the CEO.
incumbency status, and contemporaneous campaign contributions to the candidate from individuals who are not employees of the firm. We also show that the relation between CEO and employee contributions remains largely intact if we include state-cycle fixed effects or if we only consider contributions made by employees living in a different geographic area (zip code or state)
from that of the CEOs. Hence our results cannot be attributed to the geography of contributions, the presence of strong political networks in certain areas, regional demographic characteristics, or industry concentration, which have been documented to be important determinants of campaign finance by prior literature (Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski (2006); Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012) ). We also find that our results survive if we account for firm or firm-cycle fixed effects.
These latter results suggest that the impact of CEOs on their employees' political contributions is not driven by a firm-wide political orientation that attracts employees and CEOs of similar political ideology (or by CEOs hiring and retaining only those employees who share their political values).
In our second set of tests, we investigate the dynamics of employee contributions around CEO turnovers. These tests provide robust evidence that CEO political preferences affect employee contributions (even if this effect is unintended). While CEO turnovers are not exogenous to the firm's overall economic conditions, it is unlikely that the arrival of a new CEO coincides with a change in employees' political views, particularly if the CEO turnover is due to planned retirement or death. Thus, if the CEO has no influence on political giving by employees, one would expect to find no systematic relation between the change of CEO (and his or her preferred political candidates) and changes in employee political contributions. In contrast, we find that when a new CEO contributes to different political candidates from the ones supported by the prior CEO, employees tend to follow his/her lead and redirect their donations as well. This result also holds if we limit our sample of CEO turnovers only to those cases in which the departing CEO dies or is over 65 years old, as such turnovers are least likely to be caused by changes in the firm's political or economic environment. While one can never completely rule out the possibility of omitted variables in a non-experimental setting, this evidence supports the view that CEOs have a direct effect on the political choices of their employees. However, the evidence is silent on whether CEO influence is the result of his or her deliberate attempts to advocate for certain political candidates or if it is a by-product of the new CEO's actions that change the set of political candidates most beneficial to the firm. To investigate this issue further, we conduct a third set of tests to study the mechanisms behind CEO influence.
First, we identify cases in which CEOs are more likely to be active in their attempts to communicate their political views to employees. While we cannot observe all communication by
CEOs on election matters, U.S. federal law requires corporations that spend more than $2,000 per election on express advocacy of the election or defeat of a political candidate to report such communication costs to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). We find that the estimated effect of CEOs on employee contributions is five times higher in firms that report communication costs.
Thus our results cannot be fully explained by common economic shocks or reverse causality (i.e.,
by CEOs observing the political preferences of their employees and contributing to the candidates favored by them). If common shocks or reverse causality were the main driver of the relation between CEO and employee contributions, there would be little reason to expect that CEOs who deliberately try to influence their employees are more effective at doing so. We also present a case study of Murray Energy, which shows that employees increase their contributions to CEO-favored candidates immediately following the CEO's explicit attempts to advocate for them, but not before.
Thus, at least in some instances, CEOs make deliberate attempts to influence their employees' political choices and these attempts are successful. Gerber and Green (2000) ). To study whether CEOs are effective in mobilizing their employees to vote, we use individual employee survey data from the NBER's Shared Capitalism Research Project, which contains self-reported information on voting behavior (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010) ). We find that employees from congressional districts in which CEOs make campaign contributions are approximately 11.5% more likely to vote in elections. Consistent with the idea that some employees obtain information on electoral issues from their CEOs, we find that this effect is driven almost entirely by less wealthy employees and those without a college degree, who are perhaps less likely to seek out election-relevant information from independent sources.
Overall, our evidence indicates that CEOs are a political force, with potentially important implications for firms they manage and for the nature of democracy. The welfare implications depend both on whether CEOs promote their own political agenda or act in the interests of their firms, and on whether the interests of the firm coincide with the interests of its employees. If CEOs promote their own political agenda, then their impact on employee contributions is likely to be welfare decreasing. While we cannot rule out that CEOs pursue personal goals, our evidence does indicate that at least some of their political impact is driven by the interests of the firms they run:
CEOs appear to exert greater influence on employee contributions in regulated industries and to candidates with jurisdiction over the firm, both of which are likely to be correlated with firmspecific benefits from political activism but not necessarily with CEOs' political ambitions. 
Data on CEO and employee political contributions
We merge the FEC data with BoardEx, which provides biographical information on corporate board members and senior executives starting in 1999. We identify all years in which BoardEx provides the name of the CEO of an S&P 1,500 firm (31,229 firm-years, 2,507 firms) and then identify all political contributions in the FEC data that were made either by the CEO or by employees of the firm. 11 The FEC data do not share a common identifier with BoardEx. Therefore we match firm names in BoardEx with firm names in the FEC data through a "fuzzy merge" using 8 Candidates may choose to voluntarily itemize contributions below $200; however, such cases are rare (in our sample we have only seven contributions below $200). 9 Center for Responsible Politics. 10 The FEC assigns a unique identification number to each candidate running for federal office, and this identification number remains unchanged as long as the candidate runs for the same office. A different identification number is assigned when the candidate runs for a different federal office. Thus the FEC data allow us to reliably track the same political candidate across election cycles. 11 The list of S&P 1,500 firms changes over time. We retain all firms that have been part of the S&P 1,500 at any point between 1999 and 2014.
a bigram string comparator score of the firm name as reported in each data set. 12 We follow the same procedure to match the names of CEOs of BoardEx firms with the names of individuals in the FEC data. We drop contributions for which the employer name in the FEC data has not been matched with a firm name in BoardEx. We then attribute contributions to the firm's CEO if the employer name in the FEC dataset matches a firm name in BoardEx and the name of the person in the FEC dataset matches the name of the firm's CEO. We attribute contributions to the firm's employees if the employer name in the FEC dataset matches a firm name in BoardEx and the name of the person in the FEC dataset does not match the name of the firm's CEO. We drop all firmyears for which there are no contributions to any identifiable federal candidate from either the CEO or employees and also all firms with headquarters outside the United States, which leaves us with 23,765 firm-year observations for 2,287 unique firms.
Special attention needs to be paid to candidates to which neither the CEO nor the employees contribute in a given election cycle. A CEO's decision not to contribute to a candidate may in itself be informative about his/her political preferences, and employees may follow the CEO's lead by also not contributing to this candidate. However, there may also be some cases when the absence of contributions indicates that the candidate was not considered viable or relevant to the firm. We follow a conservative approach and drop all candidate-firm combinations for which there is no election cycle when either the firm's CEO or employees contributed to the candidate. We do retain cases when a firm's CEO or employees switch their contributions between different candidates running for the same office in different election cycles. As an illustration, consider the case when candidate A and candidate B compete for the same office in election cycle 1 and election cycle 2. If the firm's CEO or employees contribute to candidate A in election cycle 1 but then switch to contributing to candidate B in election cycle 2, we retain both candidate A and candidate B in both election cycles.
In the final step, we merge our sample of BoardEx firms and political contributions with
Compustat, drop observations with missing data on control variables required for our baseline specification, and winsorize all continuous variables at 1%. We aggregate data at the election cycle level by retaining the value of firm control variables in the first year of the election cycle. 13 Our final sample contains 232,153 firm-candidate-cycle observations (12,433 firm-cycles) for 2,179 unique firms and 4,602 unique candidates over eight election cycles from 1999 to 2014.
Data on voter turnout
Our data on employee voting behavior come from a survey of employees conducted as part of the NBER's Shared Capitalism Research Project at fourteen companies that have broad-based employee ownership programs (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010) ). The web-based or paper-based surveys were administered from 2001 to 2005 at 323 different work sites, and the average response rate across firms was 49.5%. In twelve out of the fourteen firms, the survey included a question that asked employees whether they had voted in the general election held in November 2000. At ten firms this question was administered to all firm employees and at two firms it was administered to a random sample of employees. While the firms chosen for the survey were not randomly selected and therefore are not necessarily representative of all U.S. employers, these firms come from different industries (eight are in manufacturing, three are in services, two are Internet-based companies, and one is a financial firm) and vary in size from fewer than 500 employees to more than 30,000 employees. In addition to the voter turnout question, the surveys included questions about demographic characteristics, wealth, and education. More details on the survey methodology and the selection of companies are provided by Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010) .
The firms in the survey have operations both in the United States and abroad. To select eligible voters, we restrict the sample of respondents to U.S.-based employees who worked at the firm as of November 2000, were at least 18 years old, and answered the voter turnout question as well as the questions we use as control variables in our baseline specification. Our final sample includes 5,677 employees working at 53 different sites.
For each firm in the sample we manually identify the firm's CEO as of November 2000
and obtain from the FEC all his/her campaign contributions to House and Senate candidates during the 1999-2000 election cycle. Further, for each firm-site location in our sample we identify the congressional district to which that location belongs and verify whether the firm's CEO contributed to any candidate running for office in that congressional district. Since Senate candidates run for statewide office, we assume that they run in each congressional district of a state. We then create an indicator variable equal to one for a given firm site if the CEO contributed to any candidate in that site's congressional district, as well as a continuous variable equal to the total amount that the CEO contributed to all candidates in that congressional district.
CEO support and employee contributions to political candidates

Summary statistics on CEO and employee contributions
In our sample, the total amount contributed by CEOs and employees to all political candidates is approximately $317 million, out of which $287 million (or 90%) are contributed by employees (see Figure 2) . Notably, there is a sharp partisan divide in employee and CEO contributions: while 60% of CEOs' political contributions are directed to Republican candidates, employees'
contributions are almost evenly split between Republicans and Democrats.
In a given election cycle, CEOs contribute, on average, $1,743 to slightly more than one political candidate. The total amount that all the firm's employees (excluding the CEO) contribute is $14,684, on average, and is allocated across approximately nine candidates (Panel A of Table   1 ). Contributions by employees are more frequent than contributions by CEOs: the former donate 83.9% of the time in our sample while the latter donate 38.3% of the time (this number is similar to the 44.3% of CEOs making contributions to candidates reported in Fremeth, Richter, and
Schaufele (2013)). Contributions in our sample come from a range of employees that includes both top and middle management. Apart from the CEO, the top 10 self-reported occupations in our sample are, in descending order: Executive, Attorney/Lawyer, Engineer, Vice President, Banker, Manager, President, Software Engineer, Financial Advisor, and Sales/Marketing.
On a per candidate basis, the average CEO contribution is $1,544 and the contribution from all employees is $1,886 (Panel B). Because our sample includes all candidates to which either the CEO or the employees contribute, we also calculate the average CEO and employee contribution across all such candidates, which amount to $93 and $786, respectively. These variables are right skewed, which is typical for political contributions (see, e.g., Duchin and Sosyura (2012);
Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012); and Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan (2014)). 
Baseline results
Graphical evidence presented in Figure 1 suggests a positive correlation between CEO and employee political contributions. To examine this association further, we estimate the following panel OLS regression (our baseline) that relates employee political contributions to those of a firm's CEO: contributions of employees that live in the same state as the CEO), the corresponding effect is 50.6% relative to the mean employee contribution. In addition, we include state-cycle fixed effects in model 3 to flexibly account for time-varying economic and political factors that affect all firms in the same state and find that our results are unchanged. Overall, it appears that our findings are unlikely to be explained by geographic factors.
Changes in political contributions around CEO turnover
We now turn to the dynamics of employee contributions around CEO turnovers. CEO turnovers may be triggered by many factors, such as poor firm performance or disagreement between the CEO and the Board of Directors about the firm's strategic direction. However, it is unlikely that shifts in the political landscape are the primary reason for CEO turnover, especially if this turnover is caused by natural retirement or death.
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There are 873 CEO turnovers in our sample. For each such turnover, we first identify the candidates to whom the departing CEO contributes in the two years before the turnover and the candidates to whom the replacement CEO contributes in the two years after the turnover. We identify all candidates who receive at least one contribution from the departing CEO in the two years before the turnover or at least one contribution from the replacement CEO in the two years after the turnover, or both. We then do the same for the candidates to which the firm's employees contribute in the two years before and/or after the turnover. Thus we include all candidates who receive contributions from either the CEO or the employees before or after the CEO turnover.
Finally, we require that the candidate ran for office in the two-year window both before and after CEO turnover. 21 We drop the year of the turnover itself from the sample since it is unclear which of the two CEOs might have had the greatest influence on employee behavior during that year.
For each candidate, we compute the difference in CEO support between the replacement CEO and the departing CEO. A difference of 0 indicates that the candidate is either supported by both CEOs or by none of the two CEOs; a difference of 1 indicates that the candidate is supported by the replacement CEO but not by the departing CEO; a difference of -1 indicates that the candidate is supported by the departing CEO but not by the replacement CEO. We also calculate 20 CEO turnovers may also be associated with simultaneous changes in the composition of the firm's workforce (e.g., downsizing, mergers, or opening of new plants), which can also alter its political orientation. We address this issue below by restricting the sample of employee contributions only to those employees who contribute under both the departing CEO and the replacement CEO. 21 This requirement excludes politicians who, for example, retired in the year of CEO turnover, because neither the employees nor the replacement CEO would have contributed to such candidates in the years following CEO change.
the difference in employee contributions by subtracting the amount the candidate receives from the firm's employees before the CEO turnover from the amount he/she receives after the turnover.
We then regress the difference in employee contributions on the difference in CEO support and report the results in Table 3 . In Panel A, we use the difference in contributions for all employees we observe. Thus, the effects documented in this panel may be due to both changes in how individual employees contribute as well as changes in the composition of contributing employees.
In Panel B, we retain contributions made only by those employees who contribute at least once both before and after the CEO turnover, thereby focusing on changes in contributions that are not caused by compositional changes.
Consistent with the idea that CEOs have a direct impact on political contributions of their
employees, we find, across all specifications, that when the replacement CEO starts to contribute to different political candidates from the ones supported by the departing CEO, employees tend to follow his/her lead and shift their support to the same candidates. A candidate supported by the replacement CEO but not by the departing CEO receives $943 in new donations from the firm's employees at the expense of candidates supported by the departing CEO (column 1 of Panel A).
The difference in contributions around CEO turnovers may stem from changes in political candidates' electoral strength. To account for this possibility, in model 2 we include candidatecycle fixed effects and find similar results. Another factor that may prompt the replacement CEO to contribute to a different set of candidates is firm-level changes around CEO turnover, such as a decrease in firm profitability or new investment. We address this possibility in model 3, where instead of using levels of control variables we use their changes from the year before the turnover to the year after. 22 Our results hold also in this specification. Finally, in model 4 we consider only those CEO turnovers that resulted from CEO death or natural retirement, which should therefore be unrelated to politics. Specifically, we choose turnover events in which the departing CEO dies or is 65 years or older (we have 256 such events, of which 12 are caused by death) at the time of the turnover and find that our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Our results hold for all employees (Panel A) as well as for the subsample of employees who contribute both before and after CEO turnover (Panel B). The magnitudes in Panel B are somewhat smaller, indicating that changes in employee contributions after CEO turnover result both from changes in the composition of contributing employees and from changes in the candidates to which the same employees contribute.
Mechanisms behind CEO influence
Why and when are CEOs able to have a significant impact on employees' political choices?
Arguably, the CEO is a natural leader of an organization, and participation in the political process may be an implicit element of a CEO's job because leaders set social norms and expectations for members of their organization (Fremeth, Richter, and Schaufele (2013) In Figure 3 we plot daily contributions made in the 2012 election cycle by Murray Energy employees to the candidates who received campaign contributions from Robert E. Murray (red bars above the horizontal axis) and to all other candidates (blue bars below the horizontal axis).
We also depict the dates of known CEO-sponsored events with shaded areas that include the date of the event and three days before and three days after the event. The figure shows that Murray Figure 3 shows no discernible pattern in employee contributions to candidates not supported by the CEO. The evidence in Figure 3 is therefore consistent with the idea that at least in some cases CEOs do have a substantial impact on how (and when) their employees contribute to political candidates. 
Mechanisms
As the case of Murray Energy suggests, direct communication on political matters may be one way for CEOs to influence employee contributions. While most communication between CEOs and employees on political matters is unobservable, in some cases such communications have to be reported to the FEC. When a firm spends more than $2,000 per election on express advocacy of the election or defeat of a political candidate for federal office, the firm is required, under U.S.
federal law, to report the amount of incurred communication costs to the FEC. We therefore rely on this piece of regulation and identify all cases in which firms in our sample report communication 28 Indeed, waiting to contribute could prove consequential for Murray Energy's employees who supported Rick Perry in the 2012 presidential race, as Perry eventually had to drop out owing to a lack of electoral support. 29 This evidence, however, is silent on whether employees at Murray Energy were coerced to make campaign contributions or whether Robert E. Murray is simply an effective communicator. For example, a former Murray Energy employee filed a lawsuit in 2014 claiming that she was fired for not making campaign contributions to the CEO's preferred political candidates (see, e.g., "Former foreman sues Murray Energy over firing," Charleston Gazette-Mail, September 9, 2014). The FEC (MUR Case #6661), in a split 3-3 decision, decided not to pursue an investigation against Robert E. Murray.
costs (approximately 1% of observations), which likely singles out those firms that are most active in promoting their political views to employees.
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To see whether employee contributions respond more strongly to CEO influence when the firm directly communicates its electoral preferences to employees, in column 1 of These results also help us to rule out a reverse causality explanation, i.e., that CEOs who observe the political preferences of their employees try to contribute to the political candidates that their employees would approve of. The fact that some firms explicitly advocate for certain political candidates and that CEO impact is largest in these firms does not support this reverse causality explanation.
Another set of firms that are likely to educate their employees on election matters, even without crossing the FEC reporting threshold, are firms that actively participate in the political process or are subject to regulatory scrutiny. Prior literature documents that firms can engage in political activism through lobbying or contributions made by their corporate PACs and shows that political engagement may be beneficial to shareholders (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010); Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008); Brogaard, Denes, and Duchin (2015) ; Akey (2015); and Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2015)). Hence, it is likely that investment in political capital has a higher expected return for firms that have corporate PACs or spend substantial amounts of money on lobbying, perhaps because such firms operate in industries subject to greater regulation or depend more heavily on the allocation of government contracts or financing. We therefore investigate whether such firms are also more successful in influencing their employees to contribute to certain political candidates.
We identify politically active and regulated firms in three different ways. First, we create an indicator variable equal to one for firms that have corporate PACs. Second, we define another Table 4 report the results. Consistent with the idea that CEO influence should be highest in firms with the highest expected returns from political participation, firms that have corporate PACs, that belong to most lobbying-intensive or heavily regulated industries all demonstrate a higher sensitivity of employee contributions to CEO contributions.
We next explore the conditions under which CEO influence on employee contributions is likely to be most effective. We first investigate whether more politically connected CEOs are able to exert greater influence on employee political contributions. There are several reasons to expect a relation. First, CEOs with political connections may be in a better position to trade off favors with politicians. Second, politically connected CEOs may themselves be more engaged in politics and have better knowledge of whether certain candidates would promote policies favorable to the firm.
In column 5, we add to our baseline specification the total number of a CEO's political connections as well as an interaction term between CEO support of a given candidate and the total number of the CEO's connections. We find that politically connected CEOs indeed appear to exert Table 4 , indicate that the sensitivity of employee contributions is stronger for politicians that have jurisdiction over the firm. 31 Since election cycles last two years, there is no direct correspondence between recessions and election cycles. We code a given election cycle as part of a recession if the U.S. economy was in recession for at least three full quarters during that election cycle. 32 Charles Stewart has generously provided committee assignment data on his website at http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. The data for House committee assignments are available for all election cycles in our sample. The data for Senate committee assignments are available through the 112 th Congress. We manually collected Senate committee assignments for the 113 th Congress (the last election cycle in our sample).
CEO political contributions and voter turnout
Summary statistics on voter turnout
Apart from campaign contributions, firm employees may directly participate in the political process by going to the polls and casting their votes for political candidates. In the United States, voting is by secret ballot, and individual employee votes are thus unobservable. However, we have survey data on employee voter turnout and can therefore investigate whether turnout is affected by CEO contributions. Panel A of Table 5 reports summary statistics for our voter turnout sample.
On average, CEOs contribute to an employee's congressional district 57.6% of the time, and the average CEO contribution across all candidates in a given congressional district is $2,508. The average reported household wealth is $498,000, where wealth includes the value of the employee's house net of the mortgage, plus the value of any vehicles, stocks and mutual funds, cash, checking accounts, and retirement accounts. Approximately 58.6% of employees in our sample have a college degree or higher, which is high relative to the national average. The share of respondents who report having voted in the 2000 general election is 78.1% in our sample, which is higher than the average state-level voter turnout of 51.0% during that election. This discrepancy may reflect people's tendency to over-report their voting activity (Harbaugh (1996) ) or the fact that our sample firms have a higher level of education or employee involvement which was previously linked to voter turnout (Schur, Kim, and Kruse (2016)).
Results on voter turnout
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is whether the employee voted in the 2000 general election. The main explanatory variables are whether the CEO contributed to any candidate in the employee's congressional district and the total amount that the CEO contributed to all candidates in the employee's congressional district.
We control for employee education, household wealth, and demographics, as well as average voter turnout in the employee's state of employment as a proxy for the general propensity to vote. Since we use interaction terms in some of the specifications, we estimate linear probability models.
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Standard errors are clustered by employee work-site.
We find that, after controlling for demographic characteristics and the general propensity to vote, employees located in congressional districts in which CEOs make political contributions are 11.5% more likely to vote than employees in other districts (we observe a similar effect if we use the total amount of CEO contributions as the explanatory variable). The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the effect of face-to-face political mobilization on voter turnout documented in Gerber and Green (2000) and Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) . Thus CEO contributions appear to be successful in mobilizing employees to vote. We caution the reader that these results are largely descriptive and do not necessarily imply causality and that we do not know whether the employees cast their votes for the candidates supported by the CEO.
We also investigate whether the effect of CEOs on voter turnout varies across employees.
In particular, we interact employee education and wealth with the indicator variable of whether the CEO contributed to candidates from the employee's congressional district. These results, reported in the last two columns of Table 5 , indicate that the effect of CEO contributions is driven almost entirely by less wealthy employees and those without a college degree. Because wealthy and educated employees are likely to vote regardless of CEO advocacy, this evidence is consistent with 33 We obtain similar results if we use probit. However, Ai and Norton (2003) and Green (2010) show that interaction terms are not necessarily informative in the context of nonlinear models.
the idea that some employees, who may not actively seek election-related information on their own, may obtain such information from their CEOs.
Conclusion
Employees contribute almost three times more to political candidates supported by their firm's CEO than to candidates not supported by the CEO, which suggests that CEO influence goes beyond firm financial and operational decisions. We show that the effect of CEO contributions on political donations by employees is not explained by common economic or geographic factors.
Moreover, this effect persists around CEO turnovers, including turnovers caused by death or natural retirement, as employees start to contribute less to the candidates supported by the departing CEO and more to the candidates supported by the replacement CEO.
The effect of CEO contributions is strongest among politically connected CEOs, in firms that explicitly advocate for the election of particular candidates, in firms that have their own corporate PACs, and in firms operating in heavily regulated industries. Further, CEOs have greater influence on employee contributions to candidates that have direct jurisdiction over the firm and during recessions, when political participation is most valuable. These results suggest that firms with the greatest potential benefits from political activism may be more likely to try to influence their employees' political choices.
Finally, we find evidence that CEO influence on employee political choices extends beyond campaign contributions and may also affect their likelihood of voting, as employees located in congressional districts in which CEOs make political contributions are substantially more likely to go to the polls than other employees. 
